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Abstract
In this paper, we measure how the fixed-interest market in Australia assesses and
responds to new economic information. We use high-frequency data, precise
announcement times and market-based forecasts to measure the reaction of bill and
bond yields to news. The period covered is from January 1994 to September 1997.
We find that announcements about US economic news have had a large impact on
yields in Australia – especially bond yields. Of the domestic announcements, the
market responds to: monetary policy announcements, the CPI, the labour force and
AWOTE, as well as a range of other economic statistics. We also find that the
fixed-interest market seems to distinguish between the information contained in
different economic announcements and that traders systematically respond to the
size and direction of any unanticipated component of these announcements. The
results suggest that the market perceives that information on prices, employment and
wages is more important in the Reserve Bank’s decisions about monetary policy
than are other indicators of economic activity. Taken in sum, the results also suggest
some consistency of response to news in the fixed-interest market in Australia.
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1. Introduction
At the broadest level, asset prices and interest rates are determined by saving and
investment, and the return on capital. These, in turn, depend to an important extent
on underlying economic conditions and expectations about economic performance.
Thus, news which influences these expectations can influence prevailing yields, as
investors adjust their portfolios in response to any reassessment about the economic
outlook. This paper examines how the arrival of new information affects yields for
short- and long-term securities in Australia. We identify ex ante what information
might be expected to affect interest rates, and measure announcement effects
associated with the release of this information. The analysis is based on high-
frequency data for market yields, and precise release times for relevant
announcements. The focus is the regular stream of macroeconomic indicators as
well as policy announcements.1
The paper does not seek a general explanation of interest rate behaviour. We simply
attempt to measure how the fixed-interest market in Australia assesses and reacts to
new economic information, the release of which is known in advance and the
content of which can be forecast. We acknowledge that the market might respond to
other economic and financial information or announcements – for example, an
unforeseen move in the exchange rate or in bond yields abroad, or, say, an
announcement by a rating agency. The current exercise is, nevertheless, of interest
since it helps describe how Australian markets respond to an important set of
economic information. It also sheds light on whether traders tend to react in a
‘rational’ way to new information – that is, are their responses in accordance with
generally accepted views about how the economy and monetary policy work? Put
                                        
1 The paper parallels the approach taken by Fleming and Remolona (1997), of the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York, who examined the announcement effects of new information on
5-year bond prices in the United States. The current study extends Fleming and Remolona’s
approach to search for effects on short-term yields (90-day bills) as well as long-term yields
(10-year bonds).2
differently, if these reactions were physical phenomena, it would be reassuring to
find that they were consistent, say, with Newton’s laws rather than chaos theory.
The Australian case might also be of more general interest since, although the
market is relatively small in global terms, it is open, active and highly deregulated.
The paper examines developments over the period from January 1994 to
September 1997. This period is determined primarily by data availability but is also
of interest because it was marked by a number of phases in interest rates. As well as
investigating what news has been important for the period as a whole, we examine
whether market reactions to particular items of news have varied between these
different phases.
The paper is arranged along the following lines: Section 2 contains a brief
description of how the literature on this topic has developed; Section 3 defines the
data, episodes and news that are of interest; the relative influence of local and
overseas news on Australian yields is discussed in Section 4; Section 5 refines the
estimates for Australian news; and Section 6 draws some conclusions.
2. Explaining Market Movements
The  efficient market hypothesis suggests that asset prices reflect all available
information and react only to unanticipated news that might be expected to affect
fundamental asset values.2 Investors and portfolio managers make decisions on the
basis of expectations about performance over the term of their investments, and
constantly seek new information that confirms, or challenges, existing assessments.
The steady stream of news about the economy and financial conditions provides
investors with a basis for comparing expectations against reality as it unfolds. Since
policy settings are also likely to influence economic performance, policy
announcements themselves are likely to affect returns on assets, especially financial
assets.
                                        
2 There are three versions of the efficient market hypothesis: weak; semi-strong; and strong.
These versions differ by their notions of what is meant by the term ‘all available information’.
For more detailed definitions of these versions, see Bodie, Kane and Markus (1993).3
The arrival of new information can affect different markets in different ways.
Fleming and Remolona (1997) note that the effect of new information on share
prices has been difficult to quantify in most studies. They consider that this is
because information about macroeconomic developments can have ambiguous
implications for share prices: an upward revision to expected real activity, for
example, would raise the expected cash flow for a stock (via increased dividend
payments), thereby increasing its present value; but it would also increase the
discount rate, which would tend to have an offsetting effect. The net effect on share
prices would depend on whether the cash flow effect dominated the discount rate
effect, or vice versa. Hardouvelis (1988) argues that some information, for example
about inflation, could, in the short term, have similarly ambiguous effects on
exchange rates.3
By contrast, cash flows from fixed-interest securities (coupon payments) are set in
nominal terms, and are, therefore, independent of revisions to expectations about
economic activity. Upward revisions to expected economic growth (which led to
higher inflationary expectations) would be fully, and unambiguously, reflected as a
fall in the price of a fixed-interest asset via an increase in the discount rate. Thus,
‘announcement effects’ from unexpected macroeconomic news might be more
readily identified in fixed-interest markets than in share markets or in
foreign-exchange markets.
Fleming and Remolona survey the evidence from a number of studies of
announcement effects on the US bond market; some of these studies are based on
daily data, with announcements measured exclusively in terms of their surprise
element, i.e. deviations of published estimates from market expectations (measured
in a variety of ways). The announcements most frequently cited as significant for
bond prices in the US have been those for the money supply, industrial production,
the Producer Price Index, the Consumer Price Index, the unemployment rate and
non-farm payroll employment.
                                        
3 In Australia, de Brouwer and Ellis (1998) suggest that inflation surprises tend to lead to an
appreciation of the exchange rate. This conclusion is based on estimating long-term
behavioural relationships rather than on the search for virtually instantaneous market reactions
– the approach in the current paper and earlier work from which it draws.4
The evidence also points to a ‘flavour-of-the-month’ effect; i.e. some
announcements seem to be in fashion for a time, before losing the market’s
attention. For example, without pre-empting the later discussion, the market reaction
to the release of current account data in Australia has varied over the years. This
may be more than a mere change of fashion; it may reflect genuine policy content
such as a change in the monetary policy regime or better understanding of the policy
regime. In the US, money supply announcements have declined in significance in
studies conducted since the mid 1980s, a period in which the importance of financial
aggregates as a guide to monetary policy progressively diminished.
Studies using intra-day price data have found a wider range of announcements to be
significant, including announcements of changes in monetary policy by the Fed
(Fleming and Remolona 1997), a practice introduced in 1994.4 Fleming and
Remolona find that market participants distinguish between announcements which
contain inherently different information, irrespective of any surprise content,
although they find that the magnitude of any surprise enhances the estimates of
‘announcement effects’ on bond prices. Urich and Wachtel (1981) had earlier
concluded that survey data of market expectations (of the kind Fleming and
Remolona use) were biased, or did not contain all available information. When
expectations were modelled as an ARIMA process they found a stronger effect from
the unanticipated element of news. We, following Fleming and Remolona, base our
study on survey information because market participants are more likely to respond
on the basis of their in-house economists’ views, or from consensus forecasts, rather
than from a more mechanical approach such as an ARIMA process.
3. Data, Episodes and News
3.1 Data
The data used for interest rates in this study are the yields on futures contracts for
90-day bank bills and 10-year bonds, which trade on the Sydney Futures Exchange
(SFE). These data are for the ‘next’ contract to be delivered, which is a very close
substitute for the underlying spot instrument, i.e. physical 90-day bank bills and
                                        
4 This practice was introduced in Australia in 1990, as discussed in Battellino, Broadbent and
Lowe (1997), who also discuss market reactions to monetary policy announcements.5
physical 10-year Treasury bonds. The markets in these instruments on the SFE are
deep and liquid, and provide reliable readings for relevant yields.
The SFE has made available timed tick-by-tick readings of bill and bond yields,
which are the basis of the current study.5 The floor of the SFE opens for trading in
these contracts at 8.30 am each day, and closes at 4.30 pm.6 Accordingly,
almost-continuous readings on yields are available between these times for the
period of the study. We measure observations at intervals of five minutes throughout
the day, although, since announcements typically occur on the stroke of the
half-hour, each observation is taken as the first ‘tick’ in the minute immediately
preceding the regular five-minute interval, to avoid missing any of the reaction of
yields to news.7
3.2 Episodes
The starting point for the study is determined primarily by data availability: the
tick-by-tick readings are available from 1993 but the coverage of the data-set on
market expectations of economic statistics (discussed below) deteriorates noticeably
as the period is extended much before January 1994. We conclude the study at
end September 1997. For purposes of looking for ‘flavour-of-the-month’ effects, we
divide the period between January 1994 and September 1997 into three episodes,
each of 15 months duration:
•  the first dates from the start of January 1994 to end March 1995;
•  the second is from the beginning of April 1995 to end June 1996; and
•  the third is from the beginning of July 1996 to end September 1997.
As shown in Figures 1 and 2, a casual observer might characterise these periods in
terms of some simple stylised facts: the first episode was dominated by a savage
                                        
5 Tick-by-tick means that a reading of yield is available for every trade carried out in these
contracts over the period of the study.
6 The trading floor is closed between 12.30 pm and 2.00 pm each day.
7 For example, we measure the movement in yields, say, for the period from 11.30 am to
11.35 am as the movement from the first ‘tick’ at 11.29 am to the first ‘tick’ at 11.34 am.6
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bear market; the second was initially a correction to earlier overshooting and
subsequently a return to a measure of stability; while the third saw a rally in
fixed-interest markets based on growing confidence that low inflation had returned
globally.
The global bear market was triggered by the Fed’s move to tighten monetary policy
in early February 1994 in its pre-emptive strike against inflation (Figure 1). In
Australia, the Reserve Bank tightened monetary policy in the second half of 1994,
as reflected in the rise in the target cash rate; the sequence of moves was widely
anticipated by the market, with the bill yield moving above the policy rate some
time before the first (and each subsequent) tightening (Figure 2). After the third
tightening in Australia in 1994, the market overshot, pricing further large tightenings
into bills.
In the second episode, monetary policy was unchanged in Australia (Figure 2). But
bill yields remained above the level of the target cash rate for some considerable
period after the last move in the tightening phase. Once the bill yield eventually
returned to the target cash rate, however, it oscillated around this level for the next
year or so. At various times in this period, markets moved to price in small easings
or tightenings according to the run of news. Bond yields in Australia moved down
for most of the period before they rose from March 1996, initially on uncertainty
about the outcome of the federal election, and subsequently on an upward revision
to forecasts of the budget deficit. These trends in yields in Australia again were not
dissimilar to those in the United States.
The third episode was characterised by falling bond yields globally as fears of
inflation receded around the world. Monetary policy was eased in Australia (in five
steps each of half a percentage point) as inflation declined and confidence rose that
low inflation could be sustained. The extent to which markets moved ahead of these
monetary policy adjustments was less marked than in 1994. In the instances in
which a change in policy had not been fully anticipated, bill yields adjusted to
reflect the new stance of monetary policy virtually as soon as the policy change was
announced. Short-term interest rates generally hewed much closer to the policy
target during this easing phase, rather than overshooting to the extent evident in the
first episode.8
3.3 News
What information is likely to be relevant for movements in interest rates?
Hardouvelis (1988) argues that newly arriving information can affect interest rates
through two channels – either through revisions to expectations about the setting of
monetary policy, which he shows can dominate movements in short-term interest
rates, or through revisions to expectations about inflation, which might dominate
long-term interest rates. Since announcements about monetary policy are now
explicit in a number of countries, including Australia, such announcements might
also be important. Edison (1997) argues that information about economic activity as
well as inflation is likely to be important because it can affect interest rates either
directly, by influencing inflationary expectations, or indirectly, by encouraging
expectations that such news might prompt the monetary authorities to adjust interest
rates.
Bill yields are likely to be heavily influenced by expectations about the near-term
setting of monetary policy. These expectations might be revised in response to
news8 about monetary policy itself or, more often, about other economic
announcements that might influence the policy setting. On the other hand, bond
yields might be expected to reflect longer-term influences. While temporary changes
in monetary policy might be expected to have a smaller effect on bond yields than
on bill yields, markets can never be certain about how temporary a change in
monetary policy will turn out to be. Simple correlations also suggest that there is a
tendency for bill and bond yields to move broadly in parallel. In practice, therefore,
short-term and long-term factors are difficult to disentangle, especially since
portfolio performance might be measured (and published) with a frequency as high
as monthly. For these reasons, as discussed below, the list of news items tested for
bond yields is the same as for bill yields.
As noted, in the spirit of Fleming and Remolona (1997), the current study
identifies – in advance – the news items that might be expected to affect both yields,
rather than adopting the approach of identifying individual large movements in these
yields and then looking for ‘causal’ items of news.
                                        
8 ‘News’ in the economic literature is generally defined as the unanticipated information
contained in any announcement. This convention is followed in the current study.9
The announcements which are the focus of this paper fall into three categories:
(i) announcements about, and official commentary on, monetary policy;
(ii) statistical releases on inflation, wages and economic activity likely to be
perceived by investors as affecting the policy, inflation or economic outlook;
and
(iii) some statistical releases, such as for the balance of payments and financial
aggregates, which have not recently figured prominently in discussion about
monetary policy but which are perceived as having been important in the past.
We also investigate, to a limited extent, whether the Commonwealth Budget speech
has an announcement effect.
As to the first category, the following announcements are investigated:
•  the Bank’s monetary policy announcements; and
•  the Bank’s regular report on The Economy and Financial Markets (including,
since May 1997, the Governor’s Semi-Annual Statement on Monetary Policy to
the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Financial Institutions and
Public Administration) and speeches by Governors.
•  In addition, the Bank’s Board meets once a month, on a timetable well known to
the market, to consider monetary policy. Given normal routines, the first
opportunity for the Bank to announce a change in policy after a Board meeting is
at 9.30 the next morning, when it announces its dealing intentions for that day.
Even though fewer than half of the policy announcements since January 1990
have occurred on this schedule, the market sometimes looks for such
announcements at this time, especially during periods of heightened uncertainty.
A routine statement of the Bank’s dealing intentions, with no accompanying
policy announcement, can itself be ‘news’, since it would flag that policy is on
hold, if only for that day. In the empirical tests discussed in Section 5, we
therefore examine whether the announcement of the Bank’s dealing intentions on
the day after Board meetings contains market-moving information. As to timing10
of the Bank’s commentary and Governors’ speeches, we assume the main
messages are transmitted from the time of their official embargo.
On the second group of announcements, the items of particular interest are those
related to inflation and, more importantly, the formation of inflationary expectations.
The Consumer Price Index (CPI) and measures of wages are vital. Currently, the
most widely observed measure of wages in Australia is average earnings of full-time
employees working a standard week (AWOTE).
As discussed, indicators of economic activity can also have implications for interest
rates. Since no single measure of activity is adequately comprehensive or timely, we
look for effects from:
•  employment as the most timely major indicator of the state of the economy
each month, and of intrinsic interest for policy;
•  retail trade which provides relatively timely information on the largest single
component of spending each month;
•  the monthly release on local government  building approvals, a leading
indicator of housing investment, which can have a major influence on the
economic cycle;
•  the monthly release on  merchandise imports which can provide an early
reading on the tempo of domestic spending or on possible developments in the
balance of payments; and
•  the quarterly GDP release which, although the least timely of these indicators,
is the most comprehensive measure of economic activity.
On the third set of announcements, a view held by some is that, from time to time,
the stance of monetary policy has been determined by pressures on Australia’s11
balance of payments, specifically the deficit on the current account.9 While the
current account is not an objective of monetary policy, the belief that it is might still
linger in some quarters. Moreover, it could be argued that the financing of the
current account deficit could affect the risk premium on bonds, or that unexpected
deterioration in it would lead to expectations of a depreciation of the Australian
dollar and perhaps to higher interest rates. Also, between 1976 and 1985, monetary
targeting was a feature of the monetary policy framework in Australia. While this
regime has long since been abandoned, it might still be the case that financial
markets regard financial aggregates as containing useful information about the
outlook for interest rates. For these reasons, we investigate the announcement
effects on bill and bond yields of monthly news on the balance of payments and
financial aggregates.
‘Unanticipated’ information is calculated as the difference between the information
as published and the median market forecast. For the first two episodes, median
market forecasts were obtained from a survey of about 30 market economists
conducted by Dow Jones the week before the release of each statistic.10 For the
third episode, the median forecasts were obtained from a similar survey carried out
by  Reuters. For monetary policy announcements, the unanticipated element is
measured as the difference between the 30-day bill yield at noon the day before a
policy change was announced and the new cash rate target after the policy
announcement.
The news releases examined for market-moving influences are summarised in
Table 1, with their frequency, normal time of release, and the approximate
publication lag after the end of the reference period. We use the first-published
(i.e. unrevised) estimates since these are the estimates to which markets initially
respond.11 All of the statistical news and monetary policy announcements are
                                        
9 The Australian Bureau of Statistics ceased publishing monthly estimates of the current account
deficit in December 1996, and began publishing monthly figures on the balance on goods and
services. Before January 1997, we use the figures for the current account deficit; thereafter, we
use those for the balance on goods and services.
10 A gap in these forecasts for AWOTE was kindly filled by BT Economics providing consensus
market forecasts from their records.
11 Markets can also respond to revisions to significant items of news, especially if these are
released separately from preliminary estimates for subsequent time periods. In Australia’s case,
this mainly affects AWOTE. We have not investigated the effect of announced revisions.12
released while the floor of the SFE is open for trading. Fiscal policy statements are
usually an evening affair but the floor of the SFE opens for the Budget speech from
around 7.00 pm to 8.15 pm.
Table 1: News Releases
Announcement Frequency Release time
(am)
Approximate lag to reference
month or quarter
(weeks)
Monetary policy announcements intermittent 9.30 –
RBA economic commentary quarterly (a) –
– Governors’ speeches intermittent variable
RBA post-Board dealing intentions monthly 9.30 –
Consumer price index (CPI) quarterly 11.30 3–4
Avergage weekly ordinary time
earnings (AWOTE)
quarterly 11.30 3–4
Employment monthly 11.30 1–2
Retail trade monthly 11.30 4–5
Building approvals monthly 11.30 4–5
Imports monthly 11.30 2–3
Gross domestic product (GDP) quarterly 11.30 9–10
Balance of payments monthly 11.30 4–5
Financial aggregates monthly (b) 4–5
Fiscal policy statements intermittent variable –
Notes: (a) The report on The Economy and Financial Markets is released in the Bank’s Bulletin at 3.00 pm;
the Semi-Annual Statement on Monetary Policy for May 1997 was embargoed until 10.00 am; that
for November 1997 was embargoed until 10.15 am.
(b) The Reserve Bank’s  Financial Aggregates media release was issued at 9.30 am until
December 1996, when – to bring it into line with the practice of the Australian Bureau of Statistics
– the Bank began to issue this media release at 11.30 am.
The items of news in Table 1 are carried by all of the major screen services virtually
instantly at the time of their planned publication. The Australian Bureau of Statistics
(ABS) and the Reserve Bank of Australia – the authorities responsible for their
publication – are highly conscious of their market sensitivity and ensure that their
public release occurs precisely on schedule. Monetary policy announcements aside,
the timing of the release of each of these items is publicised in advance in regularly13
issued publication schedules. Monetary policy announcements and the Bank’s daily
dealing intentions always appear at 9.30 am; given their nature, no schedule of
monetary policy announcements is possible.
A summary of the frequency of news is contained in Table 2.
Table 2: Summary Statistics on News Releases
Episode I Episode II Episode III Whole period
Number of news items 121 122 127 370
Number of days with news 90 98 101 289
Number of days with no news 222 211 213 646
Taking the period as a whole, there were 370 items of news, on 289 days, leaving
646 days when no announcements were made.
4. A Diversion: International Influences
The news in Table 1 all hits the screens during the domestic trading day, which is
the focus of this paper. Australia, however, is highly integrated with the global
financial system, being completely open to international capital flows: Australia has
a deregulated financial system, a floating exchange rate and no exchange controls.
Consequently, Australian financial markets are potentially exposed to the gamut of
influences on international capital flows and to any news likely to move major
overseas markets.
While the important overseas news from the United States and Europe is almost
always released when Australian markets are closed, yields on Australian securities
can respond directly to such news since the SFE’s bill and bond futures contracts
are traded overnight on SYCOM, the SFE’s electronic trading system.12 Thus, by
executing trades on SYCOM, traders of the 10-year bond futures contract in
Australia, for example, can (and do) react as soon as, say, US non-farm payrolls
data appear on screens in New York. In the first instance, such a reaction is almost
                                        
12 SYCOM is the Sydney Computerised Overnight Market, which is a computerised trading
system open between 4.40 pm and 6.00 am Eastern Standard Time (7.00 am Eastern Daylight
Saving Time) for trading in futures and options contracts on a number of financial instruments.14
always a ‘reflex’ response to any move in US yields at the time of this news. More
generally, however, the close links between the Australian and US economies,
including the well-documented similarity in the respective business cycles, mean
that US news may contain information fundamentally relevant for changes in
Australian interest rates.
Tick-by-tick readings for bill and bond yields from overnight trading on SYCOM
are available. But overnight trading lacks the breadth of participation of daytime
trading and volumes on SYCOM are much lower than during the day. Accordingly,
movements in Australian yields on SYCOM might be less reliable than those
recorded during the day. For this reason, we have not made use of the high-
frequency overnight readings but have adopted a different, somewhat less precise,
approach to estimating the effect on domestic yields of major releases of US news.
This approach involves dividing the 24-hour period into two parts: the daylight
session between 8.30 am and 4.30 pm when the floor of the SFE is open for trading,
and the overnight session (from 4.30 pm to 8.30 am the next day) when any
movement in yields would occur on SYCOM. We then estimate a pooled
regression, with the absolute change in yields during both the daylight and overnight
sessions regressed on two dummy variables (Equation 1 below). The first dummy
variable takes a value of 1 during the daylight session on days when any of the
announcements in Table 1 are made, and 0 otherwise (that is, it takes a value of 1 in
the daylight session when there is ‘domestic’ news). The second dummy variable
takes a value of 1 during the overnight session on days when US economic
announcements are made, and 0 otherwise.
The overnight dummy variable is defined for the US economic announcements
which Fleming and Remolona (1997) found to have an important effect on US bond
prices. These are (in descending order of importance): non-farm payrolls, the
Producer Price Index, Fed monetary policy announcements, retail sales, the
Consumer Price Index, the National Association of Purchasing Managers’ (NAPM)
index, industrial production and GDP.13
                                        
13 The size of the announcement effect of individual items of US news on Australian yields
would, presumably, be highly correlated with the effect on US yields. We exclude some
financial information also found to have an effect on US bond yields, such as the15
We also include two synthetic variables in the regression to capture any relationship
between the movement in yields during a particular trading session and the
movement in yields in the preceding session. For example, although Australian
yields respond to US news during the overnight session, there is sometimes a
‘second round’ effect when Australian markets open the next morning, as local
traders assimilate the US news. Similarly, when markets in the US open, traders
may respond to the movement in yields during the daylight session in Australia.
Y a b D b D b S b S e ns o ns ns ns = + + + + + 1 3 1 4 2 1 2 2 (1)
where:
Yns is the absolute change in yields on day n for both the daylight and
overnight trading sessions,  s; where  s1  = daylight session and
s2 = overnight session.
S1 =  Yns2 1 -
in the daylight session, 0 in the overnight session.
S2 =  Yns1 1 -
in the overnight session, 0 in the daylight session.
In this section, the focus is on US economic announcements, since experience
shows that they consistently affect global markets, whereas European statistical
news has a more isolated incidence. Regular economic announcements from Asia
often occur during the trading day in Australia but rarely had much effect on
Australian markets in the period being reviewed. Over the period, there were
285 days when local announcements were made and 242 days when
US announcements were made.
The important difference between the approach undertaken in this section and that
in the following section is that the absolute value of daylight and overnight changes
in Australian bill and bond yields are, respectively, regressed on a common dummy
variable for any Australian announcement and a common dummy variable for any
                                        
announcement of results of some regular Treasury Auctions – partly because Fleming and
Remolona (1997) find them to be of less importance than the run of economic news.16
US announcement. In the next section, by contrast, a dummy variable is created to
measure the separate effects of each item of local news in the five minutes after it is
released.
While the approach adopted here has obvious deficiencies, it might, at least, provide
some indication of the relative information content of domestic and US
announcements for yields in Australia. The estimated effects of Australian and US
announcements on volatility in Australian bill and bond yields are shown in Table 3.
Table 3: Impact of US and Australian Announcements
on Yields in Australia
(a)
Bill yields
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Notes: (a) The formal results from these regressions are contained in Table A1 of Appendix A.
* and ** denote significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
The estimates in Table 3 can be interpreted as the average absolute movement in
yields, in terms of basis points, on days when fresh news arrived in the respective
trading session, compared with days when no fresh news arrived. For example, over
the whole period, Australian announcements were estimated to have induced an
average absolute movement of 2.1 basis points in bill yields in Australia during the
daylight trading session; similarly, US announcements were estimated to have
induced an average absolute movement of 1.5 basis points overnight in bill yields in
Australia. The corresponding estimates for bond yields were 1.2 basis points for
Australian announcements and 3.3 basis points for US announcements. This implies
that Australian announcements had a larger impact on bill yields in Australia than
did US announcements, whereas US announcements had a larger impact on bond
yields in Australia than did local announcements. The estimated coefficients on the
synthetic variables (as shown in Appendix A) suggest some small ‘second round’17
effects, on both bill and bond yields, from US news when the Australian market
opens, and from Australian news when the US market opens.
Other features of Table 3 are:
•  the effect of Australian announcements on bill yields declined in the second
episode, perhaps because of the period of stability in monetary policy in
Australia, which encouraged expectations that policy would remain ‘on hold’.
By contrast, the effect of Australian news on bond yields increased during this
period – a period in which news about inflation was virtually pre-eminent; and
•  the size of the impact of US announcements on bond yields in Australia was
largest in the first episode when US monetary policy was being tightened. It
was also larger than the effect of Australian news in the other episodes,
although the gap between the relevant coefficients was smaller. The
insignificant effect of local news on bond yields in the first episode – and the
large effect from US news – implies that US developments simply
overwhelmed local news in the global bear market of 1994.
These results are consistent with the idea that domestic factors are more important
than international influences in the consideration of monetary policy. On the other
hand, the global bond market has become increasingly highly integrated and,
especially in a world of universally low inflation, movements in bond yields
internationally have become more tightly synchronised (see Kortian and
O’Regan (1996) and Kortian and Thompson (1998)). As the US market is the
largest and most liquid in the world, developments there inevitably set the tone
elsewhere.
As noted, the estimates in Table 3 are crude and are perhaps most useful as an
indication of the relative information content for the local fixed-interest market of
the release of local as opposed to US news. They underscore a point, however, now
more widely recognised about the significance of the US market for developments
in Australian interest rates, especially bond yields. While in 1994 the effect of US
developments on Australian yields may have been extreme, US news had a smaller,
but still large influence on short- and, especially, long-term interest rates in Australia
in the later periods of more orderly markets.18
With this background, the remainder of this paper focuses on the impact of
Australian news on bill and bond yields during the daylight trading session.
5. Announcement Effects on Yields in Australia
This section first discusses any general intra-day pattern of volatility in yields, then
examines whether specific large movements tend to be associated with the
announcements nominated, and finally, examines the extent to which there are
systematic influences on yields from these announcements.
5.1 Patterns of Intra-day Volatility
Figures 3 and 4 show a strong intra-day pattern of volatility in yields on days when
announcements were made compared with days on which there was no
announcement.14 Volatility is defined as the standard deviation of the change in the
yield in five-minute intervals over the trading day for the period from January 1994
to September 1997. The impact of news on bill and bond yields is clearly visible in
the spikes in volatility at times when announcements were made, i.e. at 9.30 am for
monetary policy announcements, and at 11.30 am for most other news.15 On days
when no announcements were made, volatility was much flatter.
Other patterns evident from Figures 3 and 4 are:
•  monetary policy announcements, as would be expected, had a notably larger
effect on volatility in bill yields than on bond yields, whereas releases of
economic news had roughly the same effect on volatility of both yields; and
•  economic news releases had a larger effect on bond yields, relative to monetary
policy announcements (and post-Board dealing intentions), whereas the reverse
was true for bill yields.
                                        
14 Intra-day bill and bond yield volatility for each episode reviewed is illustrated in Figures B1
and B2 in Appendix B.
15 There is also a rise in volatility, at around 3.00 pm, on days when the Bank’s Bulletin is
released.19





































































Volatility in yields was also higher at the open and close of trading than at other
times. This feature is slightly more evident on days when announcements were not
made, possibly because, on days when announcements were made, investors were
focusing on forthcoming news, while on other days the domestic market looks for
direction from trading in overseas markets. There is also more pronounced volatility
on both sets of days as the SFE opens for afternoon trading.
5.2 The Largest Movements
The 25 largest movements in five-minute intervals in each episode are listed in
Appendix C.16 There is no science in the choice of the number 25. However, the
twenty-fifth largest movement takes the large movements near a level that might be
regarded as a ‘normal’ response of yields to any announcement, while also giving a
reasonable representation across the range of news items. The largest move in bill
yields in a five-minute interval over the whole period was 40 basis points, while the
smallest ‘large’ move was 4 basis points; the corresponding figures for bond yields
were 26 basis points and 4 basis points.
A high proportion of the 25 largest moves in bill and bond yields has been
associated with the announcements nominated in Table 1, as illustrated in Table 4
below. They are also widely spread over the range of news. The announcements
which have most frequently affected bill yields by a large amount are (in descending
order): the labour force, monetary policy announcements, the CPI and AWOTE.
The corresponding announcements for bond yields are: the labour force, the CPI and
monetary policy announcements. While the CPI and AWOTE announcements have
affected bill and bond yields less frequently than the monthly labour force news, the
proportion of the quarterly CPI and AWOTE announcements contained in the list is
higher than for other items of statistical news, including labour force news.
                                        
16 Tables C1, C2 and C3 for bill yields, and Tables C4, C5, and C6 for bond yields.21




Episode I Episode II Episode III Total
RBA policy announcements 4 – 4 8
RBA commentary 0 1 3 4
Post-Board dealing intentions 1 0 3 4












1/2 0 0 1
1/2
Imports 0 3 0 3
Building approvals 1
5/6 2 1 4
5/6
Balance of payments 2
5/6 2 0 4
5/6
Financial aggregates 0 0
1/2
1/2
Fiscal policy statements 0 1 1 2
Unidentified 8 5 4 17
25 25 25 75
Bond yields
Episode I Episode II Episode III Total
RBA policy announcements 2 – 4 6
RBA commentary 0 0 1
1/2 1
1/2













1/2 1 0 3
1/2










Financial aggregates 0 0 1
1/2 1
1/2
Fiscal policy statements 1 1 2 4
Unidentified 9 10 3 22
25 25 25 75
Notes: (a) A score of 
1/2 is assigned to an announcement released jointly with  one other announcement
contained in the table. A score of 
1/3 is assigned to an announcement released jointly with two other
announcements contained in the table.22
Most of the largest moves associated with these announcements came in the interval
immediately after they were made. There are, however, a number of exceptions: for
bill yields, a large move in the 5–10 minute interval after the news of the tightening
in policy in December 1994; a lagged reaction of five minutes to the CPI (released
simultaneously with AWOTE) in April 1995 and again in January 1997; and large
moves within quarter of an hour of labour force news in May 1995, and in
September 1997.17 A large move in both bill and bond yields in July 1997
immediately preceding building approvals and retail sales news; and a large move in
bond yields between 11.40 am–11.45 am on the morning of the Governor’s first
semi-annual appearance before the Parliamentary Committee in May 1997, which
coincided with the release of labour force news at 11.30 that morning.
5.2.1 Comparison between bills and bonds
While similar items of news seem to affect bill and bond yields, there appears to be
some difference of emphasis:
•  ‘monetary policy’ news – monetary policy announcements, regular Reserve
Bank economic and market commentary and announcement of post-Board
dealing intentions – has been more often associated with a large move in bill
yields than in bond yields;
•  information about the CPI, AWOTE and economic activity has been equally
likely to be associated with large moves in bill yields and bond yields; and
•  fiscal policy announcements were more likely to produce a large move in bond
yields than in bill yields.
These features would be consistent with markets viewing short-term interest rates as
being tied down by the setting of monetary policy whilst revisions to expectations
about the inflation or economic outlook have implications for both short- and long-
term interest rates. All fiscal policy announcements in the period affected bond
                                        
17 In each of these instances, there was also a large move in the interval immediately after the
announcement. This explains why there are four large movements in bill yields associated with
policy announcements in the first episode, while there were only three policy tightenings. Most
of these lagged large reactions were continuations of the initial movements, although some
were reversals.23
yields (whereas only half affected bill yields), suggesting that the bond market
reacted to information about the supply of bonds implied by the Budget balance.
5.2.2 Comparison of episodes
Almost all monetary policy announcements had an effect on both measures of
yield.18 Beyond that, the CPI and labour force releases were the two announcements
which consistently and frequently affected both measures of yield. Both series have
direct relevance for monetary policy; and, as noted, the Labour Force Survey is the
most timely reading on the economy of major significance.
These announcements aside, there are notable changes of pattern between episodes.
News on AWOTE became progressively more prominent, affecting bill yields and
bond yields with increasing frequency as time passed. This perhaps reflects greater
experience of investors and funds managers with the inflation-targeting framework,
and the vital role of wages as a forward-looking indicator of inflation. The incidence
with which Reserve Bank economic commentary and post-Board dealing intentions
affected bill yields also increased. Monthly news on retail sales was associated with
more large movements in bond yields in the third episode than earlier, but
announcement effects from GDP became less prominent. Import news was
important in the second episode, soon after this release was introduced, but not at
other times. This may have been because imports provided a more timely reading on
domestic spending than retail sales, at a time when policy-makers were looking for
signs of slowing in the economy.
Balance of payments announcements became much less important over the period
studied. This item was associated with a number of large movements in yields in the
first episode but with none in the last. This may reflect several factors such as:
improvement in the balance of payments situation in Australia over the third period,
which took this indicator out of the headlines, i.e. there was a negative ‘flavour-of-
the-month effect’; or, better understanding of the inflation targeting framework
meant that this factor was simply no longer seen as directly relevant for monetary
policy; or, traders came to appreciate that monthly balance of payments statistics
                                        
18 The exceptions were the tightening on 14 December 1994 (for bond yields) and the easing on
6 November 1996 (for bill and bond yields). In both episodes, the policy adjustment was
already fully priced into the relevant yields ahead of the announcement.24
were soft ground on which to rest policy or investment decisions. It is also possible
that, more recently, news on the balance of payments had its main market impact on
the exchange rate, not interest rates.
5.2.3 15-minute intervals
We also examined the 25 largest movements in 15-minute intervals in each episode.
The large moves, and the frequency distribution of announcements, are listed in
Tables D1 to D7 in Appendix D. In the first and second episodes, the number of
large moves associated with news declines noticeably from the five-minute intervals
– particularly for bill yields. The majority of these large moves not associated with
announcements occurred within a half-hour of the morning open of trading, or in the
quarter-hour reopening after lunch.
Broadly speaking, the items of news associated with large moves in yields are
similar to those for the five-minute intervals. There are, however, two important
exceptions: monetary policy announcements and labour force news produced fewer
large movements in bill yields over the 15-minute intervals than over five-minute
intervals. This may suggest that any large ‘knee jerk’ reactions to changes in
monetary policy or labour force news tended to be quickly, at least partially,
reversed.
5.3 Information Content of Announcements
The next step is to assess which announcements systematically affect yields. There
are two aspects of interest. Firstly, we attempt to measure whether the market
systematically differentiates between the information content of different
announcements. A lay-person might refer to this as trying to establish the
‘importance’ of different items of news. Secondly, any market response should also
reflect the size and direction of any surprise in the news. Putting these two points
together simply says that it might be expected that a large surprise in the CPI would
move bond yields by more than a comparable surprise in, say, building approvals
since, for a variety of reasons, the information contained in the CPI is of inherently
more value to bond and bill traders (or policy-makers) than that contained in
building approvals.25
We measure the information content of announcements by conducting a pooled
regression, regressing the absolute movement in the relevant yield on a constant and
dummy variables defined for each news item listed in Table 1 (Equation 2):













Znt  is defined as the absolute value of the change in the yield (we loosely refer to
this as yield volatility), on day  n in interval  t; where  t = 9.30 am–9.35 am (for
monetary policy announcements and post-Board dealing intentions),
11.30 am–11.35 am (for economic statistics) and 3.00 pm–3.05 pm (for the Reserve
Bank’s  Bulletin).  K is the number of different announcements included in the
regressions.  Dknt is the set of dummy variables defined for each announcement
listed in Table 1.19  Dknt =1 if announcement k is made on day n during interval t,
Dknt = 0 otherwise.
We include an additional set of dummy variables to control for general yield
volatility during the three time intervals.  D1 1 = , for interval 9.30 am–9.35 am,
0 otherwise; D2 1 = , for interval 11.30 am–11.35 am, 0 otherwise.
The coefficient bk  provides an estimate of the impact of announcement k on yield
volatility. Hence, we can ‘rank’ announcements in order of their average impact on
yield volatility.
One factor that determines the degree of market reaction to an announcement is how
hard it is to forecast the relevant variable. Indicators with large forecasting errors,
i.e. those which tend to be associated with large surprises, might tend also to have
large announcement effects, reflected in a large estimated coefficient in
Equation (2). (The surprise element in news is discussed more fully in Section 5.4
below.) But an indicator might still be important for the operation of monetary
policy (or for investment decisions) even if it has a very small coefficient in this
regression: for example, if inflation could be forecast perfectly, there might be no
                                        
19 A dummy variable is not defined for fiscal policy statements or Governors’ speeches as their
release times are variable.26
effect on yields from CPI releases, yet inflation would, of course, still be important
in considering monetary policy. (Presumably, in such a case, changes in yields
would occur at the time market forecasts were changed.)
While acknowledging this point, it is also true that if, say, the coefficient for a
particular variable were larger than that for another variable, while the forecasting
error of the former were the same as (or smaller than) the latter, this would be prima
facie evidence that the former variable contained more information for the market
than the latter. We return to this point below.
The impact of announcements on yield volatility is summarised in Table 5. The
estimated coefficients in the table show the average difference in yield volatility
during the five-minute interval after an announcement, as compared with the same
period on days on which announcements are not made. For example, the
announcement of the CPI is estimated to have been associated with a move of about
4 basis points, on average, in the 90-day bill yield in the following five minutes,
compared with days on which no such announcement was made.
These results suggest strongly that investors and portfolio managers do differentiate
between information contained in different items of news; they are also broadly
consistent with the pattern in Table 4.
Taking the whole period, the largest effect on yield volatility has come from
monetary policy announcements, followed by the CPI. There is then a tier of news
composed of AWOTE, the labour force and GDP. There has also been a smaller
systematic response from announcements about the balance of payments, imports,
retail trade and building approvals, which had similar effects to the release of the
Bank’s commentary and announcement of its post-Board dealing intentions. It is of
interest that, as summarised in Table E2 of Appendix E, forecasting errors for the
major economic statistics – the CPI, AWOTE and employment – are smaller than
for other statistics, reinforcing the point that the market perceives that there is more
information contained in these statistics than in the others.27
Table 5: Impact of Announcements
(a)
Bill yields
Episode I Episode II Episode III Whole period



































Building approvals 0.1 1.4
* 0.0 1.1
**
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Building approvals 0.6 1.2
* -0.9 0.9
**












Notes: (a) The formal results from these regressions are contained in Table E1 of Appendix E.
(b) Announced at 9.30 am.
(c) Announced at 11.30 am.
* and ** denote significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively.28
The rescheduling of the financial aggregates release – which is published by the
Reserve Bank – from 9.30 am to 11.30 am seems to have been associated with the
market showing more interest in this announcement, although evidence over a
longer period would be needed to test whether this is a robust conclusion.20
5.3.1 Comparison between bills and bonds
The effect of monetary policy announcements was larger on volatility in bill yields
than on bond yield volatility, as was AWOTE in the second and third episodes. The
CPI and labour force news had a larger effect on volatility in bond yields than in bill
yields over the entire period.
Only announcements of monetary policy changes, the CPI and the labour force had
statistically significant effects on volatility in bill and bond yields in each episode.
While the Bank’s economic and market commentary and announcements of its post-
Board dealing intentions had significant effects on bill yields over the whole period,
these effects were relatively small. The Bank’s post-Board dealing intentions had no
significant effect on bond yields.
5.3.2 Comparison of episodes
The announcement effect of monetary policy changes on both bill and bond yields
was larger in the third episode than in the first, notwithstanding smaller moves in the
cash (policy) rate. This mainly reflected the fact that, in the first episode, the market
moved well ahead of the policy announcement, and had typically overshot the
eventual policy change. A major feature of the second episode is that, in the absence
of any monetary policy announcements, the CPI had by far the largest
announcement effect on bill yields and bond yields.
Merchandise imports were again newsworthy only in the second episode –
apparently as an indicator of domestic spending, at the expense of retail sales. The
                                        
20 As well as changing the release time, the Reserve Bank also announced in advance the date of
release. This foreknowledge may have been a factor in the increased significance of this news.
The change in timing brought this release into line with the normal scheduling of information
released by the Australian Bureau of Statistics. The change was made following a review
prompted by the IMF’s recommendations on international data standards.29
importance of balance of payments news was much diminished from the first
through to the third episode.
Again consistent with Table 4, AWOTE was much more newsworthy in the second
and third episodes than in the first. In the later episode, such announcements had a
bigger effect on volatility in bill and bond yields than any other news item, save
monetary policy announcements.
The progressively more pronounced announcement effect of AWOTE may reflect
the evolution of wage-setting and the monetary policy framework in Australia as
well as the unfolding economic cycle in the 1990s. For much of the decade
subsequent to 1983, wage-setting in Australia was determined under the Accord –
an agreement between the Government and the ACTU, the peak trade union
council. Under these arrangements, the main news about wages was typically
contained in announcements about renegotiation of the Accord, rather than in the
time series on AWOTE.
Early stages of the process of deregulating wage-setting in Australia overlapped
with a period of recession, so that wages growth fell to historically low levels,
which tended to remove this news from the financial headlines. Thus, for the best
part of a decade, the release of statistics on average weekly earnings did not attract
much comment, certainly much less in the mid and late 1980s than, say, news about
the balance of payments. It was not until 1995, in response to unsustainable
economic growth in 1994, that the latent threat of wages growth again exercised
commentators’ attention. Within the forward-looking inflation-targeting framework,
AWOTE has since remained an important factor in discussions about the outlook for
inflation. As the newly introduced  Wage Cost Index builds up a track-record,
however, it is possible that it will replace AWOTE as the main focus of public
discussion of trends in wages.
5.4 Surprises
As noted, the  efficient market hypothesis implies that only unanticipated news
should influence yields, since asset prices should already reflect prevailing market
expectations about the economic outlook. In this section, we investigate the impact
of the unanticipated news that an announcement contains, as distinct from the
information content of the announcement itself, as in the previous section. The30
approach adopted in this section assumes that yields respond according to the size
of surprises in the news and that this response is symmetrical. In other words, an
unexpectedly large rise in AWOTE would be expected to increase market yields,
and the size of the rise in yields would reflect the extent of the surprise.
Although some statistical releases contain a range of information, we limit our
analysis to the statistic which we judge to be of most interest to the market. For the
Labour Force Survey, this means the employment data, not the unemployment rate.
Underlying inflation, rather than the ‘headline’ rate, is used for the CPI. Because of
difficulties in quantifying expectations, we exclude from this analysis: Reserve Bank
commentary, announcement of the Bank’s post-Board dealing intentions, the Budget
and financial aggregates.
To estimate the effect on bill and bond yields of unanticipated news, we again
conduct a pooled regression, regressing the signed change in the yield on the signed
surprise, measured as the published statistic minus the median market forecast
(Equation 3):
S ACT FOR knt knt knt = - (3)
ACTknt  is the published estimate for series k as announced on day n in interval t.
FORknt  is the corresponding forecast.  Sknt = 0 on days when no announcement is
made.
To compare more easily the ‘surprise coefficients’ between variables – ensuring that
they are representative of typical surprises – the surprise variable, Sknt , is scaled by
the absolute average surprise for the relevant series; a list of ‘average’ surprises is
























 (Nk  is the number of releases of announcement k in the sample);
and Znt is the signed change in the yield. The coefficient ck  measures the effect of
an average surprise on bill and bond yields.
Estimates of the effect on yields of average surprises in the news are summarised in
Table 6.
Table 6: Reactions to Average Surprises
(a)
Bill yields
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Notes: (a) The formal results of these regressions are contained in Table E3 of Appendix E.
* and ** denote significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively.32
For the period as a whole, all coefficients are significant at the 5 per cent level or
lower, except those for GDP surprises on bill yields, and monetary policy surprises
on bond yields. The estimates can be interpreted along the following lines: a
published outcome for, say, the underlying CPI which was above the median
expectation by 0.2 of a percentage point – the average forecasting error – would be
expected to increase both bill and bond yields by about 5 basis points within
five minutes of the announcement.
The pattern of coefficients in Table 6 is familiar. The average monetary policy
surprise had the biggest effect on bill yields followed by the average surprise for
underlying inflation, employment and AWOTE. For bond yields, the largest
coefficient was for the CPI; average surprises in news about employment had the
next largest effect.
The declining newsworthiness of the balance of payments and GDP, and the rising
prominence of AWOTE, is again evident. It is also notable, as discussed previously,
that inflation surprises had a larger effect on yields in the second period when the
market considered changes in monetary policy to be off the agenda. To an extent,
the rising effect of AWOTE seems to have been at the expense of the CPI in the
third period. This may reflect the market’s recognition that the two pieces of
information are intimately linked for policy decisions. Since, in three quarters out of
four, AWOTE is released the day after the CPI, market participants may have come
to the view that any reassessment of the policy or investment outlook should be
made on the basis of the two pieces of information considered jointly. If this were
the case, most of the market reaction might be expected to come after the AWOTE
release.
The fact that a significant ‘surprise’ coefficient is not found for monetary policy
announcements in the case of bond yields can largely be attributed to the experience
in the first episode when the bond market rallied on the announcement of the first
and second tightenings in 1994 but sold off on news of the third. This produced a
negative (and statistically insignificant) coefficient on bond yields in this period.
This market reaction suggests that the tightenings of 1994 were, on the whole,
viewed ‘credibly’ by the bond market, i.e. the policy tightenings were expected to
work to contain inflationary pressures and, on two occasions, induced investors to
buy bonds, in the process driving yields lower. The easings of 1996 and 1997 were33
also viewed as being consistent with falling inflation and, hence, with falling bond
yields. Rallies in the bond market in response to both tightenings and easings of
monetary policy do not comply with the assumption on which the analysis is based,
i.e. the effect of a surprise must be symmetrical. This result in relation to monetary
policy announcements is similar to that found for the United States by Fleming and
Remolona (1997).
The results for bill yields might shed light on how markets perceive the Reserve
Bank’s reaction function. These results suggest that the market reacts to news on the
view that the Bank gives a greater weight to the underlying CPI, followed by
employment and AWOTE, than to other individual indicators of economic activity.
The rise in the market’s reaction to AWOTE news might suggest that – since
current growth in labour costs is likely to affect inflation some quarters hence –
market participants have increasingly accepted that the Bank sets interest rates in a
forward-looking way. Of the indicators of economic activity, the market seems to
view the Bank as giving the largest weight to labour market indicators. This might
be because either labour market conditions are of intrinsic interest to policy-makers,
or they have a crucial bearing on the climate for wage-setting and inflationary
expectations, or both.
5.5 Does the Market Respond Only to Unexpected News?
The similarity between the estimated coefficients in Tables 5 and 6 is a striking
feature of the results – i.e. the results suggest that, over the period considered, the
‘average’ information contained in an announcement was almost identical to the
effect on yields of the ‘average’ surprise in these announcements. Such a result may
be consistent with an interpretation that the market reacted only to the unanticipated
information contained in these announcements.
To test this hypothesis (albeit somewhat crudely), we extend Equation (2) to include
absolute surprises for each variable for the whole period, to attempt to differentiate
between reactions coming from announcements  per se and from surprises they
might contain, i.e:
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In a market which responded only to unanticipated news (and in which the response
was proportional to the size of surprise), for each variable, we would expect a
statistically significant estimate of coefficient  c (on absolute surprises), and an
insignificant estimate of coefficient b (on announcement dummy variables).
In interpreting the results, we ask: does the market respond only to unexpected
news? The answers, as summarised in Table 7, are classified according to the
following rules:
•  ‘yes’, if the estimate of b is statistically insignificant and that for c is significant
at the 5 per cent level;
•  ‘mainly’, if both b and c are significant but c exceeds b; and
•  inconclusive otherwise.
It is not possible to use this test to answer ‘no’ to the question posed. Since
Equation (5) is specified in terms of absolute movements, it does not capture a key
element of the market reaction to surprises – the direction of the move in yields; it
also allows  only  for a linear relationship between the surprise and the market
response.
Table 7: Does the Market Respond only to Unexpected News?
(a)
Bill yields Bond yields
Policy announcements Yes Inconclusive
Underlying inflation Yes Mainly
AWOTE Inconclusive Inconclusive
Employment Yes Yes
Retail trade Inconclusive Yes
GDP Inconclusive Yes
Imports Yes Yes
Building approvals Inconclusive Yes
Balance of payments Inconclusive Inconclusive
Note: (a) The formal results of these regressions are contained in Table E4 of Appendix E.35
On the basis of this test, there seems to be a tendency for fixed-interest markets in
Australia to react only to unexpected information. Using the above criteria, reactions
to nine of the 18 announcements contained in Table 7 are classified in this way. The
results are, on the whole, stronger for the bond market than for bills. This might
reflect the dominating influence of monetary policy announcements on bills,
whereas the bond market adjusts more gradually to the content of underlying
economic news as it comes to hand.
In the case of AWOTE, the results are inconclusive, i.e. the announcement itself
appears to be the source of volatility, rather than the unexpected component of the
announcement. There might be a number of strands to the explanation of this result.
Firstly, it is influenced to an important extent by the earlier periods, when for
reasons explained above, announcements of AWOTE were apparently regarded as
containing little information and yields did not react systematically to surprises in
the data. There is some evidence, however, from tests of the period since mid 1996,
that the market has reacted mainly to surprises in AWOTE.
A second factor might be the interaction of two aspects of our approach: the
frequency with which data on market expectations are published; and the fact that
publication of AWOTE usually comes the day after the CPI. As noted, expectations
for all of the series tested are published once a week, on the Friday before the
relevant statistics are released.21 This approach assumes that expectations are not
then revised. For most statistics, this seems to be a reasonable assumption. In the
case of AWOTE, however, the release of the CPI (usually) on the day before
AWOTE might induce some revision to forecasts of AWOTE, especially if the
inflation news contains a surprise. Any such reassessment would not be captured in
our approach, so the standard median market forecast might be out of date by the
time AWOTE is announced.
On the balance of payments, the inconclusive results may reflect
flavour-of-the-month considerations, perhaps partly due to growing acceptance that
news about the balance of payments is not a major factor in monetary policy
decisions.
                                        
21 This approach is determined by data availability.36
6. Conclusion
The results presented in this study suggest that announcements of a wide range of
economic information have systematically affected the volatility of bill yields and
bond yields in Australia over the period reviewed, from January 1994 to
September 1997. If anything, yields may have become more sensitive to the regular
run of news over this period. Announcements about US economic news seem to
have had a large effect on yields in Australia, especially on bond yields which –
based on crude measures – have been more responsive to US news than domestic
news.
The reaction in Australia of the fixed-interest market to economic announcements
suggests that traders seem to distinguish between the information content of
different economic statistics. Monetary policy announcements led to the largest
absolute change in both short- and long-term yields, followed by the CPI. CPI and
labour force announcements consistently affected yields over the period of the
study. The effect of AWOTE on yield volatility has been far more prominent since
mid 1996, whilst that of balance of payments and GDP news has diminished. The
fixed-interest market also regarded announcements about building approvals, retail
trade, imports and the financial aggregate as containing some information. Regular
Reserve Bank commentary on the economy, and announcement of the Bank’s
dealing intentions the day after Board meetings, contained information for the
market too, especially for bill yields.
Investors and traders systematically responded to the size and direction of
unexpected information in economic announcements during this period, with
monetary policy news (again) inducing the largest effect on short-term yields, as
would be expected. Monetary policy surprises, however, did not have a systematic
effect on bond yields, which tended to rally in immediate response to both
tightenings and easings of monetary policy in the period examined. The CPI and
employment news have had perennially significant effects on both bill and bond
yields. The market reaction to surprises in AWOTE increased substantially from the
beginning of the period to its end, while the effect of surprises in balance of
payments news declined. On the whole, there is evidence to support the view that,
as would be expected in an efficient market, traders react largely to the
unanticipated component of new information.37
The results suggest that the market perceives that announcements about inflation,
employment and wages growth have had a larger weight in the Reserve Bank’s
decisions about monetary policy than other indicators of economic activity. Taken in
sum, the results also suggest some order – i.e. some logic and consistency – in how
the fixed-interest market in Australia responds to news.38
Appendix A:  International Influences
Table A1: Impact of US and Australian Announcements
on Yields in Australia
Bill yields
   Episode I    Episode II     Episode III Whole period
Constant 2.1 (8.45) 1.3 (9.10) 1.5 (7.68) 1.5 (13.16)
Australian news 2.7 (2.71) 1.2 (2.47) 2.5 (3.80) 2.1 (4.89)
US news 2.0 (3.35) 1.8 (3.21) 0.6 (2.22) 1.5 (4.98)
S1 0.4 (5.60) 0.4 (7.05) 0.3 (1.41) 0.5 (8.28)
S2 0.2 (2.76) 0.1 (2.25) 0.0 (0.39) 0.2 (3.50)
Adjusted R
2 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.13
DW statistic 2.02 2.10 2.00 2.04
S E of regression 5.08 3.05 3.05 3.92
Number of observations 604 595 607 1 806
Bond yields
   Episode I    Episode II     Episode III Whole period
Constant 5.2 (12.65) 4.1 (14.09) 3.3 (15.44) 3.9 (22.47)
Australian news 0.7 (0.97) 1.5 (2.69) 1.6 (3.31) 1.2 (3.40)
US News 4.3 (5.63) 2.5 (2.87) 2.9 (5.52) 3.3 (6.94)
S1 0.2 (4.35) 0.1 (1.29) 0.0 (-0.04) 0.2 (4.62)
S2 0.1 (2.75) 0.1 (1.17) 0.1 (0.85) 0.1 (4.68)
Adjusted R
2 0.07 0.03 0.08 0.07
DW statistic 1.95 1.96 1.91 1.96
S E of regression 5.98 4.79 3.44 4.97
Number of observations 604 595 607 1 806
Notes: T-ratios are in parentheses.
When heteroskedasticity is present, White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are used to
calculate t-ratios.39
Appendix B:  Patterns of Intra-day Volatility
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Appendix C: 25 Largest Movements in Yields During Five-minute
Intervals22
Bill Yields
Table C1: Episode I
Movement
(Basis points)
Date Interval News item
1. -18.0 31 Mar 95 11.30 – 11.35 am Retail sales & GDP
2. 16.0 14 Dec 94 9.30 – 9.35 am Monetary policy announcement
3. -15.0 25 Jan 95 11.30 – 11.35 am CPI
4. -15.0 1 Feb 95 11.30 – 11.35 am Retail Sales, building approvals & balance of payments
5. 14.0 14 Dec 94 9.35 – 9.40 am Monetary policy announcement
6. 13.0 11 Aug 94 11.30 – 11.35 am Labour force
7. -12.0 7 Dec 94 9.30 – 9.35 am Post-Board dealing intentions
8. 11.0 24 Oct 94 9.30 – 9.35 am Monetary policy announcement
9. 11.0 12 Jan 95 11.30 – 11.35 am Labour force
10. 10.0 30 Nov 94 11.30 – 11.35 am GDP
11. 9.0 30 Jun 94 11.30 – 11.35 am Building approvals & balance of payments
12. -9.0 17 Aug 94 9.30 – 9.35 am Monetary policy announcement
13. -9.0 30 Mar 95 11.30 – 11.35 am Balance of payments
14. -9.0 27 Jul 94 11.30 – 11.35 am CPI
15. 8.0 28 Jun 94 9.05 – 9.10 am –
16. -8.0 12 Dec 94 9.30 – 9.35 am –
17. 7.0 29 Sep 94 11.30 – 11.35 am Building approvals & balance of payments
18. 7.0 15 Mar 95 3.25 – 3.30 pm –
19. 7.0 28 Jun 94 8.40 – 8.45 am –
20. -6.0 5 Apr 94 8.35 – 8.40 am –
21. 6.0 27 Jun 94 8.50 – 8.55 am –
22. -6.0 29 Jun 94 4.15 – 4.20 pm –
23. 6.0 1 Dec 94 8.40 – 8.45 am –
24. -6.0 1 Mar 95 11.30 – 11.35 am Building approvals & balance of payments
25. 6.0 9 Feb 95 11.30 – 11.35 am Labour force & AWOTE
Table C2: Episode II
Movement
(Basis points)
Date Interval News item
1. -18.0 27 Apr 95 11.30 – 11.35 am CPI & AWOTE
2. -13.0 4 May 95 11.30 – 11.35 am Building approvals & balance of payments
3. -11.0 27 Apr 95 11.35 – 11.40 am CPI & AWOTE
4. 10.0 11 Jan 96 11.30 – 11.35 am Labour force
5. 9.0 11 May 95 11.30 – 11.35 am Labour force
6. 8.0 30 Jun 95 11.30 – 11.35 am Building approvals & balance of payments
7. 7.0 25 Oct 95 11.30 – 11.35 am CPI
8. 7.0 26 Jul 95 11.30 – 11.35 am CPI
9. -6.0 11 Mar 96 Open – 8.35 am –
10. -6.0 18 Apr 95 2.15 – 2.20 am –
11. 6.0 21 Apr 95 11.30 – 11.35 am Merchandise imports
12. -5.0 7 Jul 95 Open – 8.35 am –
13. 5.0 13 Jul 95 11.30 – 11.35 am Labour force
14. -5.0 19 Oct 95 11.30 – 11.35 am Merchandise imports
15. 5.0 28 Mar 96 2.00 –2.05 pm Governor’s speech to Australian Business Economists
16. -5.0 11 Apr 96 11.30 – 11.35 am Labour force
17. -5.0 24 Apr 96 11.30 – 11.35 am AWOTE
18. -5.0 11 May 95 11.35 – 11.40 am Labour force
19. 5.0 11 May 95 11.40 – 11.45 am Labour force
20. -5.0 9 May 95 7.30 – 7.35 pm Federal Budget
21. 4.0 20 Apr 95 Open – 8.35 am –
22. 4.0 24 Apr 95 11.05 – 11.10 am –
23. -4.0 29 Sep 95 11.30 – 11.35 am Building approvals & balance of payments
24. -4.0 29 May 95 11.30 – 11.35 am Building approvals & balance of payments
25. -4.0 19 Sep 95 11.30 – 11.35 am Merchandise imports
                                        
22 When one of the 25 largest movements can not be attributed to a particular news item from
Table 1, it is represented by ‘–’.41
Table C3: Episode III
Movement
(Basis points)
Date Interval News item
1. -40.0 11 Dec 96 9.30 – 9.35 am Monetary policy announcement
2. -32.0 23 May 97 9.30 – 9.35 am Monetary policy announcement
3. -28.0 31 Jul 96 9.30 – 9.35 am Monetary policy announcement
4. -14.0 24 Oct 96 11.30 – 11.35 am AWOTE
5. -13.0 11 Sep 97 11.35 – 11.40 am Labour force
6. -10.0 30 Jul 97 9.30 – 9.35 am Monetary policy announcement
7. 8.0 1 May 97 11.30 – 11.35 am AWOTE & building approvals
8. -8.0 11 Sep 97 11.30 – 11.35 am Labour force
9. 7.0 20 Aug 96 7.30 – 7.35 pm Federal Budget
10. -6.0 7 Aug 96 2.00 – 2.05 pm –
11. 6.0 4 Dec 96 9.30 – 9.35 am Post-Board dealing intentions
12. 5.0 6 Feb 97 11.30 – 11.35 am AWOTE
13. -5.0 10 Jul 97 11.30 – 11.35 am Labour force & financial aggregates
14. 5.0 4 Sep 96 9.30 – 9.35 am Post-Board dealing intentions
15. 5.0 5 Sep 96 2.00 – 2.05 pm Governor’s BZW Australia Day Seminar in Tokyo
16. -5.0 16 Oct 96 3.00 – 3.05 pm RBA commentary (Bulletin)
17. 5.0 25 Jun 97 4.10 – 4.15 pm –
18. 5.0 2 Jul 97 11.25 – 11.30 am Building approvals & retail sales
19. -5.0 24 Jul 97 11.30 – 11.35 am AWOTE
20. -5.0 19 Aug 97 3.00 – 3.05 pm RBA commentary (Bulletin)
21. 4.0 17 Oct 96 8.40 – 8.45 am –
22. 4.0 29 Jan 97 11.35 – 11.40 am CPI
23. -4.0 1 Apr 97 8.30 – 8.35 am –
24. 4.0 23 Apr 97 11.30 – 11.35 am CPI
25. 4.0 4 Jun 97 9.30 – 9.35 am Post-Board dealing intentions
Bond yields
Table C4: Episode I
Movement
(Basis points)
Date Interval News item
1. 12.5 11 Aug 94 11.30 – 11.35 am Labour force
2. -11.0 25 Jan 94 11.30 – 11.35 am CPI
3. 11.0 1 Jun 94 11.30 – 11.35 am GDP
4. -10.5 17 Aug 94 9.30 – 9.35 am Monetary policy announcement
5. -10.5 24 Oct 94 9.30 – 9.35 am Monetary policy announcement
6. -9.5 30 Jun 94 8.40 – 8.45 am –
7. -9.5 1 Feb 95 11.30 – 11.35 am Retail sales, building approvals & balance of payments
8. 9.0 9 Mar 95 11.30 – 11.35 am Labour force
9. -9.0 31 Mar 95 11.30 – 11.35 am Retail sales & GDP
10. -8.5 27 Jul 94 11.30 – 11.35 am CPI
11. -8.5 25 Jan 95 11.30 – 11.35 am CPI
12. 8.5 10 May 94 7.30 – 7.35 pm Federal Budget
13. 8.0 30 Nov 94 11.30 – 11.35 am GDP
14. 8.0 29 Sep 94 11.30 – 11.35 am Building approvals & balance of payments
15. 8.0 7 Dec 94 2.00 – 2.05 pm –
16. -8.0 1 Jul 94 2.40 – 2.45 pm –
17. 8.0 4 May 94 4.25 – 4.30 pm –
18. 7.5 13 Oct 94 11.30 – 11.35 am Labour force
19. 7.5 4 Mar 94 2.35 – 2.40 pm –
20. -7.5 10 May 94 10.15 – 10.20 am –
21. 7.0 7 Dec 94 9.35 – 9.40 am Post-Board dealing intentions
22. -7.0 29 Jun 94 4.15 – 4.20 pm –
23. -7.0 5 May 94 3.40 – 3.45 pm –
24. 6.5 17 Mar 94 2.00 – 2.05 pm –
25. -6.5 29 Nov 94 11.30 – 11.35 am Building approvals & balance of payments42
Table C5: Episode II
Movement
(Basis points)
Date Interval News Item
1. 16.0 18 May 95 9.50 – 9.55 am –
2. 13.5 26 Jul 95 11.30 – 11.35 am CPI
3. 12.0 9 May 96 3.45 – 3.50 pm –
4. -12.0 18 May 95 9.55 – 10.00 am –
5. 11.5 11 May 95 11.30 – 11.35 am Labour force
6. 10.5 31 May 95 2.40 – 2.45 pm –
7. 10.5 30 Jun 95 11.30 – 11.35 am Building approvals & balance of payments
8. -10.5 24 Apr 96 11.30 – 11.35 am AWOTE
9. -10.0 9 May 96 3.50 – 3.55 pm –
10. -9.0 27 Apr 95 11.30 – 11.35 am CPI & AWOTE
11. 8.5 13 Jul 95 11.30 – 11.35 am Labour force
12. 8.5 11 Jan 96 11.30 – 11.35 am Labour force
13. -8.0 4 Mar 96 8.50 – 8.55 am –
14. 8.0 29 May 96 11.30 – 11.35 am GDP
15. 7.5 25 Oct 95 11.30 – 11.35 am CPI
16. 7.0 21 Apr 95 11.30 – 11.35 am Merchandise imports
17. 7.0 21 Feb 96 9.00 – 9.05 am –
18. -7.0 4 May 95 11.30 – 11.35 am Building approvals & balance of payments
19. -7.0 23 Apr 96 11.30 – 11.35 am CPI
20. 6.5 25 Oct 95 11.35 – 11.40 am CPI
21. -6.5 9 May 95 7.35 – 7.40 pm Federal Budget
22. 6.0 10 May 95 3.15 – 3.20 pm –
23. -6.0 21 Jun 95 10.25 – 10.30 am –
24. 6.0 21 Feb 96 8.45 – 8.50 am –
25. -5.5 29 Sep 95 11.30 – 11.35 am Building approvals & balance of payments
Table C6: Episode III
Movement
(Basis points)
Date Interval News item
1. -26.5 11 Dec 96 9.30 – 9.35 am Monetary policy announcement
2. -13.0 11 Sep 97 11.30 – 11.35 am Labour force
3. -12.5 31 Jul 96 9.30 – 9.35 am Monetary policy announcement
4. -12.0 12 Jun 97 11.30 – 11.35 am Labour force & financial aggregates
5. 9.0 13 May 97 7.30 – 7.35 pm Federal Budget
6. 8.0 3 Sep 96 11.30 – 11.35 am Retail sales
7. -8.0 24 Oct 96 11.30 – 11.35 am AWOTE
8. 7.0 24 Jul 96 11.30 – 11.35 am CPI
9. -7.0 23 May 97 9.30 – 9.35 am Monetary policy announcement
10. -6.5 10 Apr 97 11.30 – 11.35 am Labour force & financial aggregates
11. 6.0 2 Jul 97 11.25 – 11.30 am Building approvals and retail sales
12. -6.0 30 Jul 97 9.30 – 9.35 am Monetary policy announcement
13. 6.0 4 Sep 97 11.30 – 11.35 am Retail sales
14. 5.5 8 May 97 11.40 – 11.45 am Governor’s Semi Annual Statement & labour force
15. 5.5 26 Aug 96 4.25 – 4.00 pm –
16. -5.0 21 Aug 96 2.05 – 2.10 pm –
17. -5.0 30 May 97 11.30 – 11.35 am Retail sales
18. 5.0 20 Aug 96 7.30 – 7.35 pm Federal Budget
19. 4.5 29 Nov 96 8.45 – 8.50 am Comments by the Governor at the CEDA AGM dinner
20. 4.5 6 Feb 97 11.30 – 11.35 am AWOTE
21. -4.5 10 Jul 97 11.30 – 11.35 am Labour force & financial aggregates
22. -4.0 25 Jul 96 11.30 – 11.35 am AWOTE
23. 4.0 30 Jan 97 9.30 – 9.35 am –
24. -4.0 13 Mar 97 11.30 – 11.35 am Labour force
25. 4.0 23 Apr 97 11.30 – 11.35 am CPI43
Appendix D: 25 Largest Movements in Yields During 15-minute
Intervals23
Bill Yields
Table D1: Episode I
Movement
(Basis points)
Date Interval News item
1. 26.0 14 Dec 94 9.30 – 9.45 am Monetary policy announcement
2. -26.0 31 Mar 95 11.30 – 11.45 am Retail sales & GDP
3. -16.0 1 Feb 95 11.30 – 11.45 am Retail sales, building approvals & balance of payments
4. 16.0 11 Aug 94 11.30 – 11.45 am Labour force
5. -14.0 25 Jan 95 11.30 – 11.45 am CPI
6. 12.0 30 Nov 94 11.30 – 11.45 am GDP
7. 11.0 28 Jun 94 Open – 8.45 am –
8. 10.0 30 Jun 94 11.30 – 11.45 am Building approvals & balance of payments
9. 10.0 27 Jun 94 Open – 8.45 am –
10. 10.0 1 Dec 94 Open – 8.45 am –
11. 10.0 14 Dec 94 2.30 – 2.45 pm –
12. -9.0 5 Jul 94 2.45 – 3.00 pm –
13. -9.0 27 Jul 94 2.00 – 2.15 pm –
14. -9.0 16 Jan 95 Open – 8.45 am –
15. -9.0 30 Mar 95 11.30 – 11.45 am Balance of payments
16. -9.0 31 Mar 95 11.45 – 12.00 pm Retail sales & GDP
17. -8.0 7 Dec 94 9.30 – 9.45 am Post-Board dealing intentions
18. -8.0 12 Dec 94 9.30 – 9.45 am –
19. 8.0 15 Mar 95 3.15 – 3.30 pm –
20. 8.0 31 Mar 95 2.00 – 2.15 pm –
21. 8.0 28 Jun 94 8.45 – 9.00 am –
22. 7.0 12 Sep 94 Open – 8.45 am –
23. -7.0 27 Jul 94 11.30 – 11.45 am CPI
24. 7.0 7 Nov 94 Open – 8.45 am –
25. 7.0 3 Jan 95 Open – 8.45 am –
Table D2: Episode II
Movement
(Basis points)
Date Interval News item
1. -23.0 27 Apr 95 11.30 – 11.45 am CPI & AWOTE
2. -12.0 4 May 95 11.30 – 1.45 am Building approvals & balance of payments
3 11.0 21 Apr 95 11.30 – 11.45 am Merchandise imports
4. 11.0 25 Oct 95 11.30 – 11.45 am CPI
5. -10.0 11 Mar 96 Open – 8.45 am –
6. 10.0 21 Apr 95 11.45 – 12.00 pm Merchandise imports
7. 9.0 11 May 95 11.30 – 11.45 am Labour force
8. 9.0 11 Jan 96 11.30 – 11.45 am Labour force
9. -8.0 27 Apr 95 11.45 – 12.00 pm CPI & AWOTE
10. 6.0 26 Apr 95 Open – 8.45 am –
11. 6.0 13 Jul 95 11.30 – 11.45 am Labour force
12. 6.0 26 Jul 95 11.30 – 11.45 am CPI
13. 6.0 4 Mar 96 Open – 8.45 am –
14. 6.0 28 Mar 96 2.00 – 2.15 pm Governor’s speech to Australian Business Economists
15. 6.0 30 Jun 95 11.30 – 11.45 am Building approvals & balance of payments
16. 5.0 24 Apr 95 11.00 – 11.15 am –
17. 5.0 20 Apr 95 Open – 8.45 am –
18. -5.0 21 Jun 95 10.45 – 11.00 am –
19. -5.0 29 Sep 95 11.30 – 11.45 am Building approvals & balance of payments
20. 5.0 20 Jun 95 11.30 – 11.45 am Merchandise imports
21. -5.0 7 Jul 95 2.15 – 2.30 pm –
22. -5.0 13 Sep 95 2.30 – 2.45 pm –
23. -5.0 11 Apr 96 11.30 – 11.45 am Labour force
24. 5.0 30 Jun 95 11.45 – 12.00 pm Building approvals & balance of payments
25. -4.0 19 Sep 95 11.30 – 11.45 am Merchandise imports
                                        
23 When one of the 25 largest movements cannot be attributed to a particular news item from
Table 1, it is represented by ‘–’.44
Table D3: Episode III
Movement
(Basis points)
Date Interval News Item
1. -44.0 11 Dec 96 9.30 – 9.45 am Monetary policy announcement
2. -32.0 23 May 97 9.30 – 9.45 am Monetary policy announcement
3 -28.0 31 Jul 96 9.30 – 9.45 am Monetary policy announcement
4. -21.0 11 Sep 97 11.30 – 11.45 am Labour force
5. -15.0 24 Oct 96 11.30 – 11.45 am AWOTE
6. -10.0 10 Jul 97 11.30 – 11.45 am Labour force & financial aggregates
7. 9.0 1 May 97 11.30 – 11.45 am AWOTE & building approvals
8. 8.0 17 Oct 96 Open – 8.45 am –
9. -8.0 30 Jul 97 9.30 – 9.45 am Monetary policy announcement
10. 7.0 6 Feb 97 11.30 – 11.45 am AWOTE
11. 7.0 25 Jun 97 4.00 – 4.15 pm –
12. 7.0 20 Aug 96 7.30 – 7.45 pm Federal budget
13. -6.0 7 Aug 96 2.00 – 2.15 pm –
14. 6.0 3 Sep 96 11.30 – 11.45 am Retail sales
15. 6.0 5 Sep 96 2.00 – 2.15 pm Governor’s BZW Australia Day Seminar in Tokyo
16. 6.0 29 Jan 97 11.30 – 11.45 am CPI
17. 5.0 30 Sep 97 11.30 – 11.45 am Building approvals & retail sales
18. 5.0 16 Oct 96 3.00 – 3.15 pm RBA commentary (Bulletin)
19. 5.0 4 Dec 96 9.30 – 9.45 am Post-Board dealing intentions
20. -5.0 10 Apr 97 11.30 – 11.45 am Labour force & financial aggregates
21. 5.0 2 Jul 97 11.15 – 11.30 am Building approvals & retail sales
22. 5.0 16 Jul 97 8.45 – 9.00 am –
23. -5.0 24 Jul 97 11.30 – 11.45 am AWOTE
24. 4.0 23 Apr 97 11.30 – 11.45 am CPI
25. 4.0 4 Sep 96 9.30 – 9.45 am Post-Board dealing intentions
Bond yields
Table D4: Episode I
Movement
(Basis points)
Date Interval News item
1. 16.5 11 Aug 94 11.30 –11.45 am Labour force
2. -16.5 24 Oct 94 9.30 – 9.45 am Monetary policy announcement
3 -15.0 16 Sep 94 Open – 8.45 am –
4. 13.0 30 Nov 94 11.30 – 11.45 am GDP
5. -13.0 25 Jan 95 11.30 – 11.45 am CPI
6. -11.5 23 Nov 94 9.30 – 9.45 am –
7. -11.0 25 Jan 95 11.30 – 11.45 am CPI
8. -10.5 22 Jun 94 Open – 8.45 am –
9. -10.5 14 Dec 94 9.30 – 9.45 am Monetary policy announcement
10. 10.0 26 Oct 94 11.30 – 11.45 am CPI
11. -9.5 4 Aug 94 3.45 – 4.00 pm –
12. -9.5 17 Aug 94 9.30 – 9.45 am Monetary policy announcement
13. 9.5 13 Oct 94 11.30 – 11.45 am Labour force
14. -9.5 1 Feb 95 11.30 – 11.45 am Retail sales, building approvals & balance of payments
15. 9.5 9 Mar 95 11.30 – 11.45 am Labour force
16. -9.0 10 May 94 10.00 – 10.15 am –
17. 9.0 18 May 94 8.45 – 9.00 am –
18. -9.0 29 Jun 94 4.00 – 4.15 pm –
19. -9.0 30 Jun 94 Open – 8.45 am –
20. 9.0 30 Jun 94 8.45 – 9.00 am –
21. -9.0 28 Feb 95 Open – 8.45 am –
22. -9.0 31 Mar 95 11.30 – 11.45 am Retail sales & GDP
23. 8.5 31 Mar 95 2.00 – 2.15 pm –
24. -8.5 12 Jul 94 9.30 – 9.45 am –
25. 8.5 16 Sep 94 8.45 – 9.00 am –45
Table D5: Episode II
Movement
(Basis points)
Date Interval News item
1. 16.5 25 Oct 95 11.30 – 11.45 am CPI
2. 15.5 26 Jul 95 11.30 – 11.45 am CPI
3 15.0 31 May 95 2.30 – 2.45 pm –
4. -12.5 24 Apr 96 11.30 – 11.45 am AWOTE
5. 12.0 29 May 96 11.30 – 11.45 am GDP
6. -10.5 27 Apr 95 11.30 – 11.45 am CPI & AWOTE
7. 10.0 11 May 95 11.30 – 11.45 am Labour force
8. 10.0 21 Feb 96 8.45 – 9.00 am –
9. 9.5 30 Jun 95 11.30 – 11.45 am Building approvals & balance of payments
10. -9.0 4 Mar 96 8.45 – 9.00 am –
11. 8.5 21 Apr 95 11.30 – 11.45 am Merchandise imports
12. -8.5 10 May 95 Open – 8.45 am –
13. -8.0 2 Aug 95 12.00 – 12.15 pm –
14. 8.0 30 Jun 95 11.45 – 12.00 pm Building approvals & balance of payments
15. 7.5 13 Jul 95 11.30 – 11.45 am Labour force
16. -7.5 26 Oct 95 11.30 – 11.45 am AWOTE
17. -7.5 23 Apr 96 11.30 – 11.45 am CPI
18. -7.0 4 May 95 11.30 – 11.45 am Building approvals & balance of payments
19. -7.0 19 Sep 95 11.30 – 11.45 am Merchandise imports
20. 7.0 11 Jan 96 11.30 – 11.45 am Labour force
21. 7.0 10 May 95 4.00 – 4.15 pm –
22. -6.5 10 May 95 8.45 – 9.00 am After Federal Budget
23. -6.0 11 Apr 96 11.30 – 11.45 am Labour force
24. -6.0 21 Jun 95 10.15 – 10.30 am –
25. -5.5 31 Jul 95 11.30 – 11.45 am Building approvals & balance of payments
Table D6: Episode III
Movement
(Basis points)
Date Interval News Item
1. -30.0 11 Dec 96 9.30 – 9.45 am Monetary policy announcement
2. -14.5 11 Sep 97 11.30 – 11.45 am Labour force
3 -11.5 10 Apr 97 11.30 – 11.45 am Labour force & financial aggregates
4. -11.5 12 Jun 97 11.30 – 11.45 am Labour force & financial aggregates
5. 10.5 3 Sep 96 11.30 – 11.45 am Retail sales
6. -10.5 31 Jul 96 9.30 – 9.45 am Monetary policy announcement
7. -10.0 30 May 97 11.30 – 11.45 am Retail sales
8. 9.0 13 May 97 7.30 – 7.45 pm Federal Budget
9. 9.0 24 Jul 96 11.30 – 11.45 am CPI
10. -9.0 24 Oct 96 11.30 – 11.45 am AWOTE
11. -8.0 23 May 97 9.30 – 9.45 am Monetary policy announcement
12. -8.0 10 Jul 97 11.30 – 11.45 am Labour force & financial aggregates
13. -7.5 21 Aug 96 2.00 – 2.15 pm –
14. 7.5 6 Feb 97 11.30 – 11.45 am AWOTE
15. 7.5 2 Jul 97 11.15 – 11.30 am Retail sales & building approvals
16. 7.5 11 Aug 97 2.15 – 2.30 pm –
17. 7.0 23 Apr 97 11.30 – 11.45 am CPI
18. -6.5 12 Dec 96 11.45 – 12.00 pm Labour force
19. 6.5 1 May 97 11.30 – 11.45 am AWOTE
20. 6.0 27 Aug 96 8.45 – 9.00 am –
21. 6.0 29 Jan 97 11.30 – 11.45 am CPI
22. -6.0 31 Jul 97 11.30 – 11.45 am Retail sales
23. 6.0 7 Aug 97 11.30 – 11.45 am Labour force
24. -5.5 19 Aug 97 3.15 – 3.30 pm RBA commentary (Bulletin)
25. -5.0 30 Jul 97 9.30 – 9.45 am Monetary policy announcement46
Table D7: Number of Times Each News Item Contributes to the 25 Largest
Movements in Bill and Bond Yields (15-minute Intervals)
Bill yields
Episode I Episode II Episode III Total
RBA policy announcements 1 – 4 5
RBA commentary 0 1 2 3
Post-Board dealing intentions 1 0 2 3
CPI 2 3 2 7
AWOTE 0 1 3
1/2 4
1/2
Labour force 1 4 2 7
Retail sales 1
1/3 0 2 3
1/3
GDP 2 0 0 2





Balance of payments 1
5/6 2 0 3
5/6
Financial aggregates 0 0 1 1
Fiscal policy statements 0 0 1 1
Unidentified 14 8 4 26
25 25 25 75
Bond yields
Episode I Episode II Episode III Total
RBA policy announcements 3 – 4 7
RBA commentary 0 0 1 1















1/2 1 0 2
1/2






1/3 2 0 2
1/3
Financial aggregates 0 0 1
1/2 1
1/2
Fiscal policy statements 0 1 1 2
Unidentified 13 7 3 23
25 25 25 7547
Appendix E:  Empirical Results
Table E1: Impact of Announcements
Bill yields
Episode I Episode II Episode III Whole period
Constant 0.3 (9.62) 0.2 (7.59) 0.2 (7.38) 0.2 (14.18)
RBA policy announcements 11.7 (6.81) – – 21.9 (3.35) 18.1 (4.06)
RBA commentary 0.9 (1.23) 0.8 (2.93) 2.2 (2.29) 1.3 (2.98)
Post-Board market operations 1.0 (1.13) 0.1 (0.91) 2.0 (3.54) 1.0 (2.70)
CPI 5.3 (2.09) 6.1 (3.03) 1.4 (2.35) 4.3 (3.48)
AWOTE -0.6 (-0.56) 3.5 (1.84) 6.6 (3.57) 3.4 (2.73)
Labour force 2.9 (2.37) 2.4 (2.77) 2.1 (3.91) 2.2 (4.13)
Retail trade 2.2 (2.38) 0.0 (-0.09) 1.2 (3.23) 1.1 (2.40)
GDP 5.5 (2.02) 0.8 (2.01) 0.6 (1.89) 2.3 (2.02)
Imports 0.7 (1.73) 1.8 (3.34) 0.1 (0.57) 1.1 (3.38)
Building approvals 0.1 (0.08) 1.4 (2.00) 0.0 (0.02) 1.1 (2.76)
Balance of payments 3.4 (2.56) 1.8 (2.61) 0.2 (1.26) 1.6 (3.62)









2 0.42 0.44 0.64 0.46
DW statistic 1.89 1.92 1.99 1.95
S E of regression 1.26 0.86 1.28 1.24
Number of observations 936 927 942 2 805
Bond yields
Episode I Episode II Episode III Whole period
Constant 0.6 (15.23) 0.5 (15.06) 0.4 (15.15) 0.5 (25.80)
RBA policy announcements 7.4 (3.62) – – 10.2 (2.62) 9.2 (3.56)
RBA commentary 2.0 (2.21) 0.6 (1.86) 1.0 (2.51) 1.2 (3.13)
Post-Board market operations 0.4 (1.68) -0.1 (-1.38) 0.3 (3.09) 0.2 (1.93)
CPI 6.9 (5.63) 6.7 (3.66) 2.6 (2.47) 5.5 (5.76)
AWOTE -1.8 (-1.60) 2.8 (1.45) 4.3 (5.16) 1.9 (1.96)
Labour force 3.6 (4.02) 3.0 (3.30) 3.3 (3.75) 3.1 (5.88)
Retail trade 1.0 (2.40) 0.1 (0.24) 2.5 (3.91) 1.0 (3.10)
GDP 5.7 (3.47) 1.6 (1.13) 0.5 (1.43) 2.5 (2.69)
Imports 0.7 (2.34) 2.5 (5.49) 0.1 (0.89) 1.5 (4.65)
Building approvals 0.6 (0.91) 1.2 (2.03) -0.9 (-1.02) 0.9 (2.87)
Balance of payments 2.3 (3.06) 1.9 (3.18) 0.2 (1.10) 1.4 (4.63)









2 0.51 0.45 0.49 0.41
DW statistic 1.95 1.86 1.97 1.90
S E of regression 0.93 0.92 0.99 1.01
Number of observations 936 927 942 2 805
Notes: (a) Announced at 9.30 am.
(b) Announced at 11.30 am.
T-ratios are in parentheses.
When heteroskedasticity is present, White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are used to
calculate t-ratios.48
Table E2: Average Absolute Surprises
Episode I Episode II Episode III Whole period
RBA policy announcements
(basis points)
41 – 38 40
Underlying inflation (%) 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.2
AWOTE (%) 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3
Employment (’000) 21.2 33.2 21.5 25.3
Retail trade (%) 1.6 0.9 1.2 1.2
GDP (%) 0.5 0.5 0.2 0.4
Imports (%) 1.3 4.0 2.1 2.5
Building approvals (%) 4.7 3.7 4.0 4.1
Balance of payments ($b) 0.157 0.171 0.258 0.19649
Table E3: Reactions to Average Surprises
Bill yields
Episode I Episode II Episode III Whole period
Constant -0.1 (-2.11) 0.0 (-0.46) 0.1 (3.62) 0.0 (-1.12)
Policy announcements 8.8 (7.60) – – 23.3 (8.97) 17.4 (4.33)
Underlying inflation 5.3 (2.43) 7.8 (3.46) 0.6 (9.64) 4.6 (3.83)
AWOTE 0.8 (0.96) 1.4 (2.51) 6.1 (4.19) 2.4 (2.23)
Employment 3.1 (5.39) 2.7 (3.62) 2.0 (5.55) 2.5 (5.84)
Retail trade 1.7 (2.06) 0.3 (1.59) 0.9 (3.84) 1.0 (3.10)
GDP 5.2 (1.48) 0.7 (2.30) 0.0 (-0.04) 1.9 (1.60)
Imports -0.1 (-0.11) 1.7 (3.59) 0.3 (2.53) 0.9 (3.52)
Building approvals 0.8 (0.88) 1.7 (3.13) 0.5 (2.29) 1.0 (2.13)
Balance of payments 2.6 (5.76) 2.1 (2.43) 0.1 (0.62) 1.5 (2.02)
Adjusted R
2 0.44 0.56 0.82 0.53
DW statistic 2.10 1.90 2.08 2.07
S E of regression 1.31 0.79 0.93 1.21
Number of observations 936 927 942 2 805
Bond yields
Episode I Episode II Episode III Whole period
Constant 0.0 (0.09) 0.0 (-0.29) 0.0 (0.89) 0.0 (-0.95)
Policy announcements -2.1 (-0.62) – – 10.6 (3.12) 5.3 (1.62)
Underlying inflation 5.7 (5.75) 7.9 (7.10) 2.0 (5.03) 5.0 (8.16)
AWOTE 0.2 (0.54) 3.3 (2.66) 3.5 (3.61) 2.0 (2.20)
Emplyment 3.3 (20.96) 3.2 (4.31) 3.6 (6.30) 3.2 (7.03)
Retail trade 1.2 (2.16) 0.9 (3.62) 1.8 (3.24) 1.3 (4.24)
GDP 6.1 (11.44) 2.2 (1.83) -0.1 (-0.13) 2.7 (3.59)
Imports 0.0 (0.05) 2.3 (5.77) 0.2 (1.64) 1.2 (4.97)
Building approvals 0.7 (1.49) 1.5 (2.12) 0.5 (3.49) 0.9 (2.15)
Balance of payments 2.3 (7.51) 2.1 (2.81) 0.3 (1.95) 1.5 (2.68)
Adjusted R
2 0.45 0.54 0.56 0.39
DW statistic 2.02 1.98 2.07 2.02
S E of regression 1.14 0.94 1.00 1.16
Number of observations 936 927 942 2 805
Notes: T-ratios are in parentheses.
When heteroskedasticity is present, White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are used to
calculate t-ratios.50
Table E4: Does the Market Respond Only to Unexpected News?
Bill yields Bond yields
Constant 0.3 (18.30) 0.5 (40.79)
Dummy for
Announcement
Absolute Surprise Dummy for
Announcement
Absolute Surprise
Policy announcements 2.8 (0.55) 15.6 (2.28) 7.0 (1.71) 2.2 (0.49)
Underlying inflation 0.7 (0.56) 3.5 (2.77) 2.2 (1.98) 3.2 (3.33)
AWOTE 3.6 (2.21) -0.1 (-0.12) 1.8 (1.74) 0.2 (0.15)
Employment -0.4 (-0.65) 2.5 (4.07) 0.2 (0.42) 2.9 (4.57)
Retail trade 0.6 (0.79) 0.4 (0.79) 0.0 (0.09) 0.9 (2.41)
GDP 0.9 (1.14) 1.3 (1.08) -0.8 (-1.24) 3.2 (4.25)
Imports -0.2 (-0.42) 1.0 (2.85) 0.2 (0.44) 1.1 (3.09)
Building approvals 0.2 (0.32) 0.8 (1.62) 0.2 (0.40) 0.7 (2.00)
Balance of payments 1.4 (1.93) 0.1 (0.16) 0.6 (1.07) 0.7 (1.33)
Adjusted R
2 0.57 0.52
DW statistic 1.93 1.90
S E of regression 1.11 0.91
Number of observations 2 805 2 805
Notes: T-ratios are in parentheses.
When heteroskedasticity is present, White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are used to calculate
t-ratios.51
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